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


10 March 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Belgium: Opposition to the principle of permitting nuclear weapons on Belgian soil is growing and could cause serious trouble for the coalition government, which is already beset by internal quarrels on other issues. Passage on 7 March of the law permitting stationing of NATO forces on Belgian territory precipitated a bitter debate in the Belgian Senate on the problem of nuclear launching sites. Despite Foreign Minister Spaak's denial that such sites were involved in this legislation, more than half of the Socialist senators opposed or abstained on the vote, while many right-wing Social Christians (Catholics) supported it reluctantly.

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The US Embassy is concerned that this growing opposition may prejudice the signing of the NATO atomic cooperation agreement for training Belgian forces in the use of nuclear weapons which was provided for under the atomic stockpile agreement of 1960.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Japan - South Korea: The Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers are scheduled to meet in Tokyo on 12 March to begin negotiations on outstanding differences between their countries. South Korean junta leader Pak Chong-hui is anxious for financial help for his five-year economic development plan and is seeking a Japanese counteroffer to Seoul's demand for a \$1.2 billion claims settlement.

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Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Federal Prime Minister Welensky, in calling for Federation-wide elections, probably hopes to induce the largely white electorate, in the absence of an acceptable alternative, to reaffirm his mandate to preserve the Federation by whatever means he considers appropriate when the long-adjourned federal constitutional conference reconvenes in London. Welensky seems to be relying on his own popularity, and the weakness of the white opposition parties, to carry him through the election in the face of the growing disenchantment of the white electorate with the present federal structure. Even some of his cabinet ministers, however, have apparently deserted him on the Federation issue, and his party colleague, Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Whitehead, reportedly is exploring a plan whereby the Federation would break up into independent states which would try to set up a new association. Welensky's efforts to bolster his position thus seem likely to prove abortive, and prospects for the long-term survival of the Federation in its present form are poor.

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Yemen: A tribal uprising against the rule of the Imam has begun in eastern Yemen, apparently initiated by the return from prison of the son of the tribe's sheik, who was executed in 1949 after the assassination of the former Imam. The tribe has long opposed the Imam's designation of his son Badr as crown prince. Supporters of Prince Hasan, Badr's chief rival to the succession, have their stronghold in the area of the revolt and may throw their support to the rebels. Crown Prince Badr has had only limited success, thus far, in rallying the tribes in this area to suppress the uprising.

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\*Vietnam:

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Communist China, in a Foreign Ministry statement on 24 February, called for consultation between the powers which had participated in the 1954 conference, and on 28 February North Vietnam issued a memorandum advocating Vietnamese reunification elections as outlined in the 1954 agreement. The North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists have called for these elections before and probably do not expect that South Vietnam would agree now, but the Communists may hope they can arouse neutral support for a conference and that any such pressure for negotiation might have a restraining effect on US military support for Diem.

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\*West Germany: Bonn has decided to relieve its Ambassador to Moscow, Hans Kroll, following the public controversy which arose in connection with the ambassador's statements on German-Soviet relations at an off-the-record press briefing last month. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Kroll would return to Moscow temporarily before being reassigned to the Foreign Ministry in Bonn as an adviser on Western policy. The decision to remove Kroll is probably prompted by a desire to counteract any misunderstanding that may exist regarding Bonn's loyalty to the Western alliance. Although press charges against Kroll were apparently exaggerated, available information indicates that he did express views clearly at variance with Bonn's official position, including a proposal that both West and East Germany be admitted to the United Nations and a recommendation that Bonn seek to improve relations with Moscow via bilateral talks. Adenauer may also have been annoyed with Kroll's suggestions that Bonn might have to make concessions on defense questions affecting West Germany. In a press interview with the Paris newspaper Le Monde on 9 March, Adenauer again rejected the idea of any direct negotiations between his government and the USSR, saying such talks had no prospect of success and would only arouse the distrust of Bonn's allies.

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Difficulties of Belgian Government

The coalition government of Prime Minister Lefevre is in increasing trouble because of fiscal reform, education reform, linguistic problems, and the question of pensions. Failure of Lefevre to obtain wholehearted support from his own Social Christian (PSC) party for his economic reform program, as well as Socialist opposition to many of its provisions, has bogged the measure down in Parliament and discredited Lefevre's leadership. Although on 8 March he obtained a vote of confidence on the controversial pension bill, the prime minister's influence has been weakened and the existence of his government jeopardized by the slow progress made on these various issues.

The long-standing differences on education are coming to a head in a PSC proposal to split the Ministry of Education into Walloon (French) and Flemish components. The fact that the Socialists are strongly French-speaking and the Social Christians heavily Flemish complicates the situation by injecting the always troublesome language issue. Friction between the parties and within the Social Christian party has reached the point where an open break is possible in the absence of far-reaching compromises. Although Lefevre may be forced to resign, there is strong pressure for continuation of the present coalition under new leadership--possibly that of Spaak, who commands widespread support.

Under the circumstances, the Belgian Government has been reluctant to consider the NATO stockpile agreement, with its overtones of nuclear warfare which were certain to precipitate a bitter parliamentary debate and create major political difficulties. Moreover, Belgian enthusiasm for NATO has subsided considerably since the Congo debacle, and the government has only with reluctance met its minimum NATO commitments.

# South Korea and Japan to Open "Top-Level" Negotiations

Preliminary negotiations on the working level have proceeded smoothly in the resolution of technical matters, but further progress depends on high-level decisions to fix the terms of a final agreement. Prime Minister Ikeda was persuaded to agree to early "top-level" negotiations when South Korean security chief Colonel Kim Chong-pil, on behalf of junta leader General Pak Chong-hui, visited Tokyo late last month to discuss the situation.

South Korean Foreign Ministry officials envisage several rounds of these talks, alternating between Tokyo and Seoul, covering the major issues--claims, fisheries, and the status of Korean residents in Japan. The working-level negotiations will continue to clarify the details and translate principles agreed to by the foreign ministers into a working blueprint for a final agreement.

Ikeda probably would prefer to delay political negotiations until the Japanese domestic political climate becomes more favorable. Japanese Socialists and other leftist opposition elements have threatened to make an issue of any settlement that does not include the North Koreans. Ikeda probably would like to maintain political calm at least until after Diet upper house elections and his own re-election as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic party, both expected in July.

Tokyo's recent renewal of its long-standing proposal that the Japanese and South Koreans submit their conflicting claims to the Liancourt Rocks--barren islets about midway in the Sea of Japan between Korea and Japan--to the International Court of Justice may be a maneuver to gain time. The South Koreans have rejected the Japanese proposal and have asserted that disposition of this issue should not be a part of the forthcoming negotiations. [REDACTED]

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### Prime Minister Welensky Calls Elections


[Welensky's United Federal party (UFP) controls 41 of the 59 seats in the federal assembly; the rest are divided among the right-wing Dominion party (DP), European representatives of African interests, and independents. The assembly includes 14 Africans, most of them members of the UFP and all of them regarded as "stooges" by most of the Federation's Africans. The African nationalists in all three territories--Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland--apparently plan to boycott the federal elections.]

[Welensky's personal prestige with the whites, who dominate the voting rolls, has never been higher. Moreover, the DP, the only other major European party, has been troubled by factionalism and weak leadership; it therefore has not been able to mobilize the anti-Federation sentiment which is latent among the whites, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. Within Southern Rhodesia its influence has been further reduced by Whitehead's well publicized and relatively successful efforts to liberalize the racial attitude of the 220,000 whites who live in the territory.]

[Thus, in the sphere of federal politics, Welensky is likely to have little serious opposition. Federal issues, however, are likely to be increasingly overshadowed by the particular interests of the inhabitants of each territory. Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia have been virulent in their opposition to a federation run by whites in Salisbury, and the whites in Southern Rhodesia have become more critical of their ties with the northern territories as the latter advance toward African rule. Particular interests tend to govern, as they did last December when Whitehead banned the Southern Rhodesia African nationalist party without even consulting Welensky. As a result, officials in both London and Salisbury tend to regard the Federation--at least in its present form--as a dead letter.]

[the Macmillan government has abandoned hope of retaining the Federation unless]

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its powers are greatly reduced. London still wants to retain the closest possible association among the three territories in order to foster economic progress and cooperation between the anticipated African governments in the two northern territories and the deeply entrenched white minority in Southern Rhodesia. The British are not optimistic that even this much can be saved, however

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